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What is the relationship between the arguments that Aristotle and Simplicius attribute to Zeno 
of Elea, and the account of motion that Aristotle presents in the Physics? Do the considerations that 
Aristotle raises in Physics Z.9 overcome the arguments about motion that he attributes to Zeno? Do 
they show the Zenonian arguments to be inapplicable or ill formed? Or do considerations that Zeno 
raises in the discussions attributed to him instead undermine Aristotle's account of motion? Do they 
undermine the possibility of physics as epistëmë! And why does Aristotle not treat Zeno's 
arguments about magnitude and plurality in his account of motion? After all, motion involves 
distances and multiple positions and times.
What is at stake here is phusikë as epistëmë: If it can be shown that his conception of motion 
is incoherent or self-contradictory, then there is for Aristotle small prospect of a science of physics, 
an account of phusis through its archai. If it can be shown that problems of the sort Zeno raised 
with respect to plurality and magnitude will surface in the account of motion that Aristotle 
proposes, then we shall need to ask whether or to what extent this undermines the possibility of an 
epistëmë of phusis.
I. Background
I have referred to "the arguments attributed to Zeno" because we have no complete statement 
of any of Zeno's arguments. Even where we have what seem to be quotations from Zeno, namely in 
the arguments about magnitude and plurality reported by Simplicius, the conclusions are generally 
not quoted; they are paraphrased, interpreted, or perhaps provided by Simplicius. Most importantly, 
there are no quotations that might indicate what Zeno intended his arguments ultimately to show, 
what points he meant them to serve.
Would Zeno have concluded, for example, that if contrary implications follow from the 
assumptions that he took to be the basis of the claim that there are multiple things, that therefore 
there could not be multiple things? That is, did he hold that something whose account is self­
contradictory cannot be?1 Or did he instead hold that an alternate account or framework is needed, 
or that a further explanation might be sought? If he did conclude that there could not be multiple 
things, would he infer from this - as he is often taken to have done - that what is must be one? That 
would not follow immediately from the claim that there could not be multiple things, much less 
from the notion that supposing that there are multiple things leads to contradictions. It is frequently 
claimed that Zeno intended to show that what is is one and motionless; but I think we must look 
carefully to see whether we should be justified in making such a claim.
It is worth noting that in none of the quotations from his work does Zeno say that what is is (or 
must be) one, that what is does not (or cannot) move; nor even that there are not multiple or 
moving things. This in itself does not show that he did not say or mean these things, but it is also 
worth noting that Aristotle and Simplicius do not establish, in the Physics and its commentary 
respectively, that he said those things^. In fact, Aristotle does not name Zeno, in Physics A.2-3, as 
having been one of those who claim that what is is one and immovable, whereas he does include 
Parmenides and Melissus in that group. Zeno's remarks on plurality and magnitude might place him 
in the unenumerated group of "those who inquire whether being/what is (to on) is one and
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immovable" at 184b25-185a2, a point I will discuss shortly; but to inquire into the nature and 
number of to on is not the same as to say that what is is one and immovable.
Many modern commentators - e.g. Russell, Owen, Benacerraf, Grünbaum, Faris, Curd3 - infer 
that Zeno tried to show that what is is one and that motion must be impossible. According to 
Simplicius, Zeno "showed in each of his attempts (epicheirëmata) that by saying that many [things] 
are, opposites (opposite things) follow" (in Phys. 139,5; DK B2). The "opposite" results would be 
e.g. that everything must be both so small as to lack magnitude and indefinitely large. A further 
assumption is required, though, in order to pass from this result to the further conclusion that there 
cannot be multiple things. That assumption is that if asserting the existence of something X has 
contradictory or inconsistent implications, then X cannot be, or at least cannot be as we had said it 
was. We have no evidence that Zeno accepted this further assumption.4 Neither can we conclude, 
on the basis of the extant fragments, that Zeno meant to assert that motion is impossible. The 
fragments show only that common assumptions about what motion involves result in 
inconsistencies.5 So we need not assume that Zeno meant to deny motion and/or plurality, and we 
certainly need not assume beyond this that he meant to assert that what is is one and unmoving.
However, Aristotle argues in Metaphysics Γ.3-4 that in order to understand anything through 
inquiry, we must hold that nothing can both belong and not belong to a thing in the same respect at 
the same time. In order for us to investigate phusis, we must not hold that any aspect of it involves 
a contradiction or inconsistency. Whether what we must suppose in order to study phusis is true 
unconditionally or tout court is another matter, and one not investigated in the study of phusis.
II. Zeno’s Appearances in Aristotle’s Physics
Aristotle does not quote or paraphrase any of Zeno's arguments concerning plurality or 
magnitude in the Physics. A remark at 184b25ff. suggests why this is the case. Aristotle says that 
"to examine if what is is one and immovable is not to examine about phusis; for just as the 
geometer has no argument against the person who denies (abrogates) the principles (archai) of 
geometry, but the argument is either of another epistëmë or of things common to all epistëmai, in 
that way so too in the case .concerning principles; for a principle yet is not, if only one and one in 
this way is. For a principle is a principle of some thing or things." Zeno's rehearsals of the 
implications of the claim that there are multiple things would seem to fall under the heading of 
"examining if what is is one". Therefore they would not be part of physics, nor would they be 
compatible with it.
In contrast, Zeno's arguments concerning motion can be discussed in a work on the study and 
epistëmë of physics because they can be understood or used in a way that takes them as invoking 
(and not directly examining) the supposition that there are multiple things. Whether Zeno meant the 
arguments concerning motion to contribute to the undermining of the thesis that there are many 
things (as philosophers such as Owen have suggested7) is another matter. The arguments 
concerning motion can be considered as separable from the investigation of plurality and 
magnitude, for example in the sense that they can be advanced by someone who believes that there 
are multiple things with magnitude. The claim that there is motion presupposes plurality (or states, 
places, and/or things), but the converse is not true.
By Aristotle's time the term 'geometría' had come to invoke, at the most fundamental level, 
entities that could never be observed: points without magnitude, lines effectively without width, 
planes effectively without thickness, and so on. The characteristics of points, lines, planes, and so 
on are given us by axioms and definitions. Points, lines, angles, and the axioms and definitions that 
express their properties, are at least some of the archai of geometry to which Aristotle refers8. Is
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what is true of geometry also true of physics, or does Aristotle mean to imply that it is? Aristotle 
leaves open the possibility that at least some of the fundamental entities for physics - which is 
generally thought to study the observable world - are in fact not the kind of thing that could ever be 
observed. He seems to imply that any science of physics must accept that at least some of the 
sources of observable things (points, nows, infinite divisibility) are known only through the axioms 
and definitions we pose.
Aristotle thus offers the following reasons for putting aside arguments concerning plurality 
when discussing phusis. First, the study of phusis as epistëmë requires one to search for archai 
(.Physics A, 184al Off), and if we say that only one thing is, then we cannot identify a source and a 
thing of which it is a source (because that is - at least conceptually - two things, or some actual 
division; 185a3-5). Second, Aristotle notes in Book B that things that "are by phusis" appear to 
have a principle of motion and of standstill; this implies that in speaking of what is "by phusis" 
(what is "by nature") one takes as given that archai are involved. Put another way, closer to the 
statement of 184b25ff., the study of geometry requires that one hold that there are lines, planes, 
circles, points, and so on, of a particular kind. These would be, or exhibit, principles or sources of 
geometry. One who denies that such things are cannot study geometry. One who inquires as to 
whether there are such things is making an inquiry that is outside the province of geometry. One 
who sought proof before engaging in the study of geometry that the principles of geometry were 
real, proof that there are points without magnitude, one-dimensional lines that were the shortest 
distance between two points, and so on, would be delayed (at best) in his or her geometric 
endeavors. Now, the geometer cannot, by means of geometry, prove that the principles of geometry 
are real (whatever that would mean), or that they are valid and are in effect across all contexts or 
independent of geometry. Similarly, the "physicist" (the person who studies phusis "scientifically") 
cannot by means of physics prove that the things we must suppose, the things we must take as 
given (e.g. that there are multiple things, some of which are movable), in order to say that there is 
phusis and in order to study that, are real or valid or in effect. Physics does not address the question 
at all. Aristotle makes no pronouncement as to whether Zeno's arguments concerning plurality and 
magnitude are valid in their own right, or appropriate for the investigation of things other than 
phusis (such as, e.g., the sorts of things investigated in the Metaphysics).
Let us consider some implications of Aristotle's analogy at 184a25-b5 between inquiring into 
whether what is is one and immovable, and failing to accept the archai of geometry. First, we 
should note that Aristotle does not say that it is necessary or desirable to accept the archai of 
geometry (except for purposes of studying geometry and anything that requires its use), nor that the 
principles of geometry are known to be true, accurate, valid, etc. across all contexts, or at all. He 
only points out that a student of geometry must accept these principles, and that their fundamental 
meaning and validity are not things that are or can be investigated by or within geometry. One 
needs to accept the principles of geometry in order to study and to use geometry, and to accept 
those of physics in order to study or to use physics. But Aristotle does not add, "And we must 
accept the principles of geometry because they are known to be as we say they are, across all 
contexts," or "And we must accept the principles of geometry because geometry is 
useful/beautiful/good/etc." He says nothing about whether or why or under what circumstances or 
in what contexts he thinks the principles of geometry or of physics should be accepted, and these 
subjects investigated. He says nothing about his assessment of the value or the meaning of 
geometry or of physics; he gives no reasons for accepting or not accepting the principles of either 
one, beyond interest in each subject. He does not say that the principles of physics are known to be 
as we say they are (e.g. that things are and move, or that motion is as we take it to be), across all
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contexts; he says only that "for us" (presumably, we who would seek epistëmë peri phuseös, 
184al4-15), "let it be hypothesized (hupokeisthë) that the things that are by nature, either all or 
some of them, are moving things" (185a 12-13). He gives no further information to suggest a 
limitation of the parallel between physics and geometry; and indeed Aristotle does not say that 
acceptance of the principles of physics is needed or desirable for anything outside of the study of 
phusis. The question of whether acceptance of these principles is necessary or desirable outside of 
the study of physics is a question that is beyond the bounds of physics. So too is the question of 
whether it is necessary, desirable, or justifiable to accept the principles and study physics.
In other words, Aristotle does not say that Zeno is wrong to examine at all whether there are 
multiple or moving things; nor does he say that a proper conclusion for such an examination would 
be to say that there are indeed multiple or moving things. That examination is not part of the study 
of phusis as such. The study of phusis does not require or proceed from proof that there are 
multiple things or motion. Aristotle only says that one who examines whether what is is one and 
immovable cannot at the same time be studying phusis. To study physics, then, one must sacrifice 
the investigation of the truth, validity across all contexts, meaning, and implications of the 
assumptions that multiple things and motion are.
Importantly, if such an assumption contains or is based on any contradictions or 
inconsistencies, or if any contradictions and inconsistencies must follow from the use of that 
assumption in conjunction with others fundamental to physics, then these contradictions and 
inconsistencies will be embedded in the findings of physics. Aristotle argues in Metaphysics Γ.3 
that the "most certain" (bebaiotatë, 1005bl7) of all archai, that which one must have in order to 
understand anything of beings (1005M5-17), and the archë that is the archë of all axioms 
(1005b33-34), is a principle of non-contradiction: "It is not possible for the same thing both to 
belong to the same entity and not belong to the same entity at the same time and in the same 
respect" (1005bl9-20). In that case if the fundamental assumptions of the study of nature result in 
contradictions or inconsistencies, then the same assumptions that make it possible to search for or 
to pursue the epistëmë of physics also undermine physics as epistëmë. The meanings of terms used 
in physics will then .depend on contradictions or inconsistencies.
In order to examine this potential problem we must first consider what Aristotle says about 
physics as epistëmë in the first sentences of the Physics, and then look at his response to Zeno's 
remarks about motion in Z9.
III. Status of the archai of phusis
Aristotle began the Physics with a call to try to determine things concerning the principles or 
sources {ta peri tas archas) pertaining to the epistëmë concerning phusis. We should make this 
attempt, he says, because "we think" (oiometha) we know a thing when we are aware of relevant 
first causes and principles and elements, and on this basis in the case of all inquiries (methodoi) 
concerned with principles or causes epistasthai and eidenai follow on the awareness of these. For 
Aristotle, then, if the inquiry into phusis studies something that has causes and principles and 
elements, the standard way of trying to find knowledge {gignöskein, 184al2) about that something 
is to try to become acquainted with these principles, causes, and so on. The way to try to attain an 
epistëmë concerning phusis, if it is attainable at all, will be to try to become acquainted with the 
principles, causes, and elements of phusis. It is not yet clear, from what Aristotle has said, that 
there is an epistëmë of phusis, or that there could be. As for whether phusis has principles or 
sources, it follows that we must take it to have some if physics as epistëmë is to be taken to be 
possible, as noted above.
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It is in the context of inquiry concerning phusis that Aristotle enjoins us to "let it be 
hypothesized" (185a 12-13) that at least some things move or are moved; and if we hold this 
hypothesis we must take it that there are principles (to account for distinctions among things, for 
varieties of motion, differences of place, etc.). Why should we hypothesize this? "It is clear" from 
epagôgë (185al3). That remark is explicated in Book B at 192b8-15, 192b20-23, and 193al-9: the 
things that are said to be by phusis appear (phainetai) to differ from other things by way of having 
a principle of moving and of standing still. Phusis would then be a cause and a principle of being 
moved and of being still (ëremein) in those things to which it belongs primarily and not 
accidentally. That there is phusis, or that phusis is, is simply phaneros, visible or manifest: it 
appears {phainetai). It cannot, Aristotle says, be proven, in that it would have to be proven from 
what is aphanos, unapparent or not manifest. That attempt at proof would encounter the problem 
that we would not be able to be sure that the terms we were using referred to or accounted for real 
visible things (193a8-9).
Thus Aristotle does not prove, or attempt to prove, that there are multiple things that move. 
Rather, he starts from the notion that there are multiple things that move, as a hypothesis 
fundamental to the possibility of an epistëmë of physics. He goes on to defend the hypothesis 
against potential objections that arise in response to its implications. It is in that regard that he takes 
on the arguments and conceptions he attributes to Zeno.
IV. Zeno and Physics Z
Book Z is the book of the Physics in which Aristotle most comprehensively addresses Zeno's 
work on motion. It begins with a conditional: "If continuity, contact, and succession are such as 
defined earlier [sc. in Z3]...then it is not possible for a continuous thing to be made of indivisibles" 
(231a21-24). Thus a line will not consist of points, nor will a magnitude; and time will not consist 
of "nows" (moments, instants). Nor will anything be in motion in (within) a now; and no point or 
other indivisible will be in motion, except accidentally.
Aristotle does not say, "Since continuity, contact, etc. are this way," but rather, "If they are as 
they were defined (diöristai)". He is treating these relationships (continuity, contact, etc.) not as 
though he knows that he is presenting an adequate and accurate account of what is, but instead as if 
he is presenting a hypothesis that invokes a set of proposed fundamental definitions.9
Thus we may look at Book Z as being in part an exploration of the implications, the successes, 
the failings, and the "cost" of the use of these definitions or distinctions in the study of motion. The 
definitions or distinctions offered, specifically, were that things are said to be continuous 
{suneches) if their extremities (<eschata) are one; to be touching (haptesthai) if they are together 
(i.e. in one place; not in distinct places); and in succession (ephexes) if there is no thing of the same 
kind between them (Book E, 226bl8-227a3).
Aristotle does not explain exactly what extremities are, but it would seem that extremities in 
this sense could not themselves have extremities, or else contact that is not continuity could not be 
said to occur. This would seem to suggest, though Aristotle does not say it, that extremities would 
be points, or else boundaries that lack thickness. That Aristotle would understand extremities in this 
way is also suggested by the analogy to time, the extremities of whose intervals are indivisible 
moments or nows.
Aristotle goes on in Z1 to argue that if a line is continuous and a point is indivisible, then 
(contrary to the assertions of modern geometry and of the physics it is used to model) a line camiot 
be made of points; similarly, if time is continuous (as argued in E4, 228bl-l 1), it cannot consist of 
nows or moments. In so far as a two-dimensional or three-dimensional object or shape is seen as
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continuous (as it would have to be if it is to be called one object or shape), it too will be infinitely 
divisible, i.e. divisible into things which are always divisible (231M5-18), and this would seem to 
imply that it cannot consist of boundaries within boundaries etc. Motions too will be continuous 
(228a20-bl 1), as well as objects in motion (235a6-7) and changes (235b24-25).
How, then, are points related to lines and magnitudes, and nows to intervals of time? Aristotle 
says that we say (234a23) that a now is an indivisible thing that is "in time" (en töi chronôï). And 
there will have to be such a thing, according to Aristotle, given what has been said, because an 
indivisible thing must be the limiting extremity of two successive intervals, that is, the point where 
one leaves off and the other begins. For if the two extremities were not one, the two intervals, e.g. 
past and future, could not be in succession, and if they were separated there would be time between 
them. If what separated or distinguished the two intervals were to be an interval of time, then the 
two intervals would overlap (so that, as Aristotle says, part of the past would be in the future and 
vice-versa), or part of the dividing interval will be in each of the divided ones; and the now will not 
be all the same thing. These alternatives Aristotle finds to be unacceptable, and so the now is taken 
to be an indivisible thing dividing - and, equally, "in" - two time intervals.10
The case of points and lines or magnitudes should be analogous to that of nows and time 
intervals; Aristotle says at 233al5-20 that "the divisions will be the same both for the time and for 
the magnitude". So if intervals or lengths of magnitude that are successive must be divided by 
something indivisible, that something would be a point, and the point would be "in" or "on" the 
interval or magnitude - just not "in" it as a part.
Then if time is not composed of nows, Aristotle says, Zeno's "Arrow" argument fails. Aristotle 
does not give a clear account of this argument, but says that its result was that a flying arrow is 
motionless (<akimton, 239b7) and that its result was that a flying arrow stands [still] (hestëken, 
239b30).n Certainly, being motionless is not necessarily the same as standing [still] numbers are 
motionless but do not stand still), but Aristotle has already noted that when a thing that by nature 
moves (to pephukos kineisthai) is not moving in the ways it naturally does, we say (legomen) that it 
is resting (234a31-33).
The argument of the Arrow seems to say that if the arrow at any moment "is over" (extends 
over, ëi kata) what is equal [to the arrow in length or perhaps volume], then at all moments during 
a given interval it is "over" something equal to its length. At each now, if it is over a length equal to 
its own, then (and this Aristotle does not state) it is not moving. (If it were moving, it would be 
traveling "over" a distance greater than its length during any interval of time, or so we say for any 
interval.) Therefore, Zeno is supposed to have argued, if the arrow is not moving at any now in the 
interval, it is not moving during the interval as a whole, even as we say it is flying.
This conclusion depends, as Aristotle notes, on the assumption that the interval is composed of 
nows. This assumption is false if the conceptions Aristotle has accepted are true, so he rejects the 
Arrow argument. According to Aristotle, if we do not claim that time is composed of nows, we do 
not have to conclude that the arrow does not move, even though we say that it does not move (or 
rest, 234a31-34) in any instantaneous now. On the conception Aristotle offers, time is full of nows 
but not divisible into them. Time is divisible only into divisible intervals, which are not reducible to 
or deducible from nows, or vice-versa. Distance, traveled by the arrow, is divisible not into points, 
but into intervals or segments that are themselves always divisible. Points do not move, except 
incidentally12, and nothing moves within a point. Intervals or magnitudes are not reducible to or 
deducible from points, nor points reducible to or deducible from intervals or magnitudes. Thus for 
Aristotle the Arrow argument he attributes to Zeno fails in two ways. First, if the argument says 
that a thing that does not move in any now during an interval does not in fact move during the
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interval, then the argument fails in that it wrongly assumes that the interval is composed of nows. 
Second, if the Arrow argument says that a thing that does not move at any now during an interval 
must be at rest in every now in the interval, then the argument fails because nothing either moves 
or rests in a now.
V. Implications
If we put aside Zeno's arguments concerning the inconsistent implications of multiplicity and 
magnitude, we can begin to seek epistëmë concerning phusis. But we will only attain that 
knowledge if the archai of phusis are coherent and do not have inconsistent or contradictory 
implications. As it turns out, accepting the assumptions that make it possible to study phusis, 
accepting a physics based on Aristotle’s account of time, length or magnitude, and motion, comes at 
the price of striking limitations on possibilities for knowledge. That price includes both a limitation 
on precision and an inconsistency in fundamental principles.
The first problem is this. Aristotle has shown that on his proposed understanding of nows and 
intervals, it is incorrect to say that an interval is composed of nows. He has shown that an argument 
that portrays an interval as composed of nows - as he says Zeno's arguments do - comes to an 
incorrect conclusion about a moving thing. But if nows are indivisible and not parts of intervals, 
and if intervals are infinitely divisible, there will be no way to determine exactly when a motion or 
a resting begins or ends. As Aristotle remarks at 237b21-2, "in whatever [sc. change or state of 
change] a thing may be, it is not in it as a first [change or state of change].” Whatever is changing 
(motion being a species of change) must also have changed; and whatever has changed must also 
have been changing (237a9-20). Everything that is in motion must have moved before (earlier in 
the same movement) (236b32-33), and there is no first time at which anything that is [changing by] 
coming to a standstill is coming to a standstill (239al).13
That is, not only can we not identify the exact point or instant at which something began to 
move, or was moving, or ceased to move, or began to cease to move; but we also cannot say that 
there was such a point or instant. In fact, it seems that we must say that there was not such a point 
or instant. Yet we say that motions have definite beginnings and endings, and it was precisely 
through saying this that we arrived at the conclusion that they cannot be said to have definite 
beginnings or endings. The situation is similar for distance; there would seem to be no first point 
that a moving object crosses, no last point that it crosses before stopping. In effect, Zeno's 
arguments about magnitude, the ones Aristotle had put aside as not falling within the province of 
physics, have resurfaced in Aristotle's account of motion. We can say that something begins and 
continues to move, on this account, as long as we do not - and as long as we cannot - say when or 
where it was first moving or changing, or even that there was an initial point or instant of the 
motion or change. Similarly, if we say that one object is moving past another, we will not be able to 
specify the first point on each that passed any of the other, nor the first point on each that was 
passed.
Zeno's arguments about plurality and magnitude, as presented by Simplicius, take the form of 
dilemmas, exploring e.g. the consequences of the leading part of a thing having magnitude and of 
its having zero magnitude. Aristotle does not present Zeno's arguments about motion in dilemma 
form. Could there be another horn to the Arrow argument, for example? According to Aristotle, 
Zeno considers the case of time being composed of durationless nows, and that is why his 
argument fails. But what would happen if one took as a hypothesis instead that time was composed 
of infinitely divisible intervals, as Aristotle proposes that we take it to be?14
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One result that would follow is that there would be no interval in which the arrow was over a 
space exactly equal to its resting length (recall that Zeno seems to have suggested that everything is 
supposed to be "over" a space equal to its length), although the arrow does not grow. This is 
consistent with Aristotle's conclusion that there is no "first" time at which a thing is moving, nor a 
"first" point or interval over which it moves (238b36-239a2). We need to be able to say, of a 
moving thing, that it started here and went there, and so on; and on Aristotle's account, we cannot. 
This second horn of the dilemma does not show that motion does not exist, but it does show a 
fundamental incommensurability and a contradiction that are an important "cost" of physics.
Simplicius describes Zeno's arguments about plurality as showing that if we say that many 
[things] are, saying opposite[s] [things] results. Similarly, as we have seen, if we assume that things 
move, opposite[s] result. For physics, we wind up saying that the moving arrow both must and 
cannot extend over a length equal to its own at each now; or else we must say that the arrow travels 
at once through both an interval of time and a series of nows that do not add up to or reduce to an 
interval of time. We must say that at least some movements begin and end, but we must also say 
that there is no first time at which a thing began or ceased to move.15
Then if we cannot determine a first part of a motion or a first moment or interval of motion, 
our precision in physical inquiry will be limited (asymptotically). This leads to a question: given 
this apparently approximative character (in relation to the world we say we study in physics), what 
exactly does physics tell us, and what does it tell us about?
Beyond the lack of precision, there is another "cost" in physics that we must address, namely 
that of the principles. Research based on the fundamental hypotheses of physics can be carried out 
even if those hypotheses are flawed or problematic; the meaning and adequacy of the results might 
need scrutiny, but research can be conducted. But if physics is to be an epistëmë or any kind of 
understanding, it must have coherent and non-contradictory archai (according to the remarks on 
non-contradiction in Metaphysics Γ.3-4). Does physics as Aristotle portrays it have coherent and 
non-contradictory principles? Aristotle provides no clear answer to this, but only points out that 
this is not a question asked within physics. Even if physics "works", in the sense of Aristotle's 
account of motion allowing theorems that have or seem to have predictive success, the meaning of 
the findings of physics will be affected by the nature and applicability of the underlying 
assumptions.
Zeno explored the fact that conceptions of unity, plurality, motion, distance, and time all seem 
to invoke both continuity and division or limitation, intervals and points or moments or boundaries. 
On Aristotle's account of motion, intervals and points, moments, or boundaries are not 
interreducible and cannot be derived from one another. Yet they are either archai of phusis or 
necessary to such archai, for two reasons. First, because if there is a principle there is plurality; and 
second, because physics deals with that which can be said to move or change, and such things, as 
Aristotle says, seem to involve the notion of distinction as well as that of continuity, in both space 
and time (at least).
Zeno was right, I think, if he suggested that incommensurabilities, contradictions, and 
incoherences arise from the notion of things that are distinct and infinitely divisible. And if we are 
to take it that there are to be multiple things, we must take it that they are distinct (or they would 
not be multiple) and infinitely divisible (or we would not be able to take it that they were, or that 
they had content). But then the limit point of a thing (or a time) cannot be found in its last part, 
because there is no such thing as a last part, and the limit will not be part of the thing. At the same 
time no series of division-points will exhaust a thing. Yet points are said to be "on" or "in" the 
thing or time interval. If points were derivable from intervals or if they composed intervals, we
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could not say that there were things at all. In this way the archai of physics are or invoke 
incommensurable entities, and in some sense contradictories.
Zeno reveals a further incoherence connected with Aristotle's portrayal of motion. Motions 
must be said to begin and to end, but on Aristotle's account nothing is in motion as something 
"first"; whatever is said to be in motion must also be said to have been in motion. Line segments or 
distance intervals must be taken to have endpoints; but no point can be taken to be the first or last 
in the segment or interval. These sound like Zenonian "opposite things" resulting from Aristotle's 
hypothesis. Aristotle could say that points and intervals are said to be "in" lines and segments in 
different senses of "in", but this does not solve the problem. It only means that the claim that there 
are spatial things, temporal intervals, and motion requires an equivocation.
Put another way, if we cannot identify a beginning of a motion we cannot account for the 
transition from rest to motion, or for the difference between rest and motion. This recalls Zeno's 
Dichotomy argument {Physics 239b 10-14 and 263a4-b9). In any case it makes the archai of 
physics incoherent, or even contradictory.
As Aristotle said, this is not a problem for physics to study. It does seem to undermine the 
possibility of physics being an epistëmë. Aristotle does not say that an epistëmë concerning phusis 
has been achieved, and perhaps the Physics can be seen as in part an attempt to see whether that 
achievement is possible. But in undermining the possibility of physics being an epistëmë, the 
problems I have mentioned also undermine the possibility of our being able to gain demonstrable 
knowledge of the observable world through physics. The unit of magnitude or time, which makes 
physical inquiry possible, also undermines that inquiry.
If an epistëmë gives knowledge of archai, and a case arises in which the purported archai 
invoked by some body of learning are found to contradict one another or to "lead to saying opposite 
things" (as in Simplicius' description of what Zeno was trying to show about common 
assumptions), will that body of learning qualify as an epistëmë? I would think not, for on the basis 
of contradictory archai, anything could be derived. And if from the archai in combination opposite 
things are found to follow, it seems that we will not have epistëmë either: anything could be 
accounted for, and anything contradicted.
But does a contradiction, or "opposites following]", with respect to a thing mean that the 
thing is not? (We have seen that there is no evidence that Zeno thought that a contradiction or 
"opposite conclusions" meant this.) In an epistëmë, or toward the development of an epistëmë, we 
must say that whatever has contradictory results or a contradictory nature or account cannot be. As 
Aristotle notes, though, this must be accepted axiomatically in order to seek epistëmë. For that 
reason, it cannot be proved, or disproved. It is part of what makes proofs possible, and nothing will 
be called an archë if this principle is not accepted. This says nothing about what must be, 
independent of our conceptions or unconditionally, but only states what we must take to be the case 
if proofs and epistëmë are to be possible. The question then arises as to whether or on what basis or 
under what conditions we can say that there are archai, and epistëmai, at all. Acknowledging this 
question has important consequences concerning the relationship between philosophy and scientific 
thought. Zeno's investigations of the unit and of motion implied such a question, and Aristotle's 
approach to those investigations, in the Physics, suggests that he was aware of this.
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Endnotes
1. Hegel asserts in section 89 of the Logic (Hegel 1975, 133) that "Zeno, who first showed the 
contradiction native to motion, concluded that there is no motion." As we will see, this sort of 
assumption about Zeno is implicit in a number of other important modern interpretations of his 
work.
2. One passage in Aristotle's Physics may say that Zeno argued for there being no motion. At 
239M1-14, Aristotle describes one of Zeno's arguments (logoi) concerning motion as being 
"peri tou me kineisthai." Aristotle says that he had treated this argument earlier; this was at 
233a2, where he does not say that Zeno intended to show that motion was impossible. He would 
be attributing this intention to Zeno, though, if he held that Zeno insisted that any motion 
required a moving object to touch or traverse an infinite or indefinite number of points. Yet it is 
not clear whether the me kineisthai that Aristotle refers to is the conclusion of Zeno's whole 
argument, or only one part of a dilemma, or something that Zeno will follow to a further 
conclusion that Zeno intends to serve a larger point (following from the untenability of the 
saying that motion is not, or from the assumptions that made motion require crossing or 
touching an infinite or indefinite number of points). The phrase peri tou më kineisthai appears as 
a paraphrase or an inference and not a quotation. Aristotle also suggests in the Topics (160b8- 
10) that there is an argument of Zeno's to the effect that moving is impossible, and then again in 
the Sophistical Refutations (179b20-21) and in the Prior Analytics (65b 15-19) that Zeno argued 
that moving is not (that there is no moving). In none of these cases, however, does Aristotle 
elaborate, or identify the argument of Zeno's. Simplicius claims that Zeno intended to show that 
all things are one (in Phys. 138, 20-22); but he provides no quotations from Zeno that show this 
intention.
3. Russell 1970, 45 and 47; Benacerraf 1970, 103; Owen 1970, 140f; Grünbaum 1970, 165; Faris 
1996, 108-115; Curd 1998, 172nll8. In contrast, Barnes 1982 observes that in the extant 
fragments Zeno "argues 'If P, then Q', where Q states some absurdity; but he does not explicitly
infer the falsity of P he does not use reductio ad absurdum as a technique for disproof' (236).
Barnes sees Zeno as not much more than an "eristic disputant" (236) whose "aims were critical, 
not constructive" (294). While I agree with Barnes that Zeno's surviving fragments contain no 
conclusions about what is, and that they do not offer any alternatives to the absurdities they turn 
up, I will argue that Zeno does make a substantial positive contribution to philosophy and 
science.
4. In DK B2/in Phys. 139,5 Simplicius says that Zeno showed that "in saying that many [things] 
are, saying the opposites (opposite things) follows," tëi polla einai legonti sumbainei ta enantia 
legein. This... specific mention of saying may suggest that Zeno's focus was linguistic or 
epistemological.
5. Glazebrook 2001 argues that "Zeno's paradoxes of motion demonstrate that mathematizing 
nature results in absurdity" (205), not that motion is impossible (195). Glazebrook shows that 
neither Zeno nor Aristotle would hold that there could be a mathematical science of physics. I 
will argue here that Zeno's paradoxes also pose serious or possibly insurmountable obstacles to 
the development of any science of phusis, mathematical or otherwise.
6. Aristotle mentions Zeno's Millet Seed argument at 250al9-25 with respect to movement of air.
7. Owen 1970, 141. In order to get from the (possibly non-Zenonian) claim that there cannot be 
multiple things to the conclusion that there must be just one thing, we must make the further 
assumption that unity and multiplicity of beings of the kinds we usually conceive are our only
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alternatives. But another alternative might be to suggest that our conception of what it is to be a 
thing within phusis is flawed.
8. At Posterior Analytics 76a31-bl6, Aristotle names points, lines, magnitude, and the straight as 
archai for geometry. He also says geometry also posits or takes (lambanein) the meaning of that 
which is incommensurable or irrational (alogos), the broken or inflected (to keklasthai, 
apparently referring to lines bent or "broken back" at a surface), and inclining or verging 
(ineuein). See also Heath 1981, vol. 1, 336-337.
9. As definitions, these cannot be proven to be correct or valid, although they could perhaps be 
shown to be inadequate if they should be found to fail to cover something important about the 
phenomena they puiport to delineate.
10. In Δ3, 210al4-24, Aristotle enumerates eight ways in which one thing is said to be "in" (en) 
another. He does not identify which if any of these ways he has in mind at 234a22-24 where 
when he speaks of nows as being "in time."
11. Shamsi 1994 and Faris 1996 (chapters 4 and 5) makes careful studies of possible 
reconstructions of the argument, with somewhat different conclusions as to the details of its 
implicit premises and the senses of its explicit ones. What I will say here does not turn on the 
acceptance of either of these readings.
12. That is, a point is said to move if the segment of magnitude that it is "in" or "on" moves.
13. This must mean that there is no first "now" and no first point on a path of motion. See Lear 
1981,92-93.
14. Brochard 1954 proposes that the four paradoxes of motion form a dilemma (4). The Arrow 
begins from the supposition that space and time are composed of indivisibles, and shows that on 
this supposition, to say that a thing moves across an interval results in incoherences and 
contradictions. On reaching these results, one might wish to explore the supposition that space 
and time are infinitely divisible. The Dichotomy, Brochard holds, traces what would follow 
from that supposition, and like the Arrow it treats the case of a single object moving across an 
interval.
15. After having argued at 237b 19-22 that something cannot be in a state of change as "something 
first," Aristotle refers at 238b31-32 to a "first time in which something is coming to a stop." 
Then at 238b36-239a2, he repeats that there is no "first" [interval of time] in which a thing in 
motion is moving or in which a thing coming to a stop is coming to a stop. Bolotin 1993 (331- 
333) suggests a way of understanding these remarks such that they do not form a contradiction: 
where a "completed change is not preceded by other completed changes, it also makes sense to 
speak of a first or primary time during which something is changing" (333). This is a time 
during which something is changing, not a time at which something changes: it will make some 
sense to say that there is a first or last interval during which a change is taking place, but not to 
say that there is a first or last point or instant. We must also note the approximative character of 
the sort of first and last intervals Aristotle will allow. If the starter's pistol goes off at noon, and 
at 12:00:01 the runners are visibly in motion, certainly the first interval of the race can be said to 
be 12:00:00-12:00:01. But we cannot identify the last now when a runner was not moving, nor 
the first now when the running had begun.
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